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ust as the popularization of comput-
ers in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
gave rise to computer hacking, the 
recent accessibility and affordabil-
ity of relatively easy (and widely 
hyped) genome-editing technologies 
and resources has spurred interest in ge-
netic “biohacking”—molecular genetics ex-
periments performed outside institutional 
laboratories by individuals who may have 
little formal scientific training. Regulation 
of the work of professional scientists and 
traditional scientific institutions is robust, 
although it still faces scrutiny in the wake 
of He Jiankui’s genome-editing experi-
ments on Chinese twins (1). However, regu-
lation of genetic biohacking has received 
far less attention, even though, like tradi-
tional scientific research, it is likely to pro-
duce a range of innovations while posing a 
number of risks to public health. Here, we 
explore these risks and the consequences 
of understanding that some instances of 
regulatory failure for biohacking are inevi-
table. And, where they are not, we suggest 
that agencies, policy-makers, and private 
parties have the opportunity to improve 
oversight of genetic biohacking using the 
tools they currently possess.
GENETIC BIOHACKING
Experiments to modify genetic expression 
that once required specialized training and 
substantial investments in equipment and 
reagents can now be conducted for a few 
hundred dollars and with a basic instruc-
tion manual. Genomic sequencing can be 
done using portable pocket devices, some of 
which cost less than a plane ticket. The rise 
of direct-to-consumer genetic testing has 
also resulted in individual access to raw ge-
netic data, fueling a variety of health, well-
ness, ancestry, and relative identification 
services that offer to interpret those data.
As these technologies go mainstream, 
some individuals have begun conducting 
genetic experiments outside of traditional 
scientific labs, such as those associated with 
universities, research institutions, and reg-
ulated corporate entities. Some of these ex-
periments have involved humans, although 
thus far they appear to be limited to self-
experimentation with one’s own body—an 
activity that has an ancient pedigree in tra-
ditional medical research.
The motivations of these genetic biohack-
ers, some of whom lack any formal training 
in biology, are diverse and often complex. 
Some appear to be motivated by norma-
tive beliefs in a “right to do science.” Others 
place a high value on bodily autonomy or 
creative expression—a right to experiment 
on themselves or use genome editing for 
expressive purposes. Some view biohack-
ing as a means of self-care, where, for ex-
ample, they experiment with alternatives 
to (sometimes expensive) regulated drugs. 
Still others harbor views that traditional 
scientific institutions are poor regulators of 
themselves or are slow and needlessly cum-
bersome. And some, frankly, are moved by 
anti-government sentiments.
Reflecting these diverse motives, recent 
reports of genetic biohacking include a 
broad array of experiments: genetic modifi-
cation of bacteria, yeast, plants, nonhuman 
mammals—and also humans, in the form of 
genetic self-experimentation. This includes, 
for example, self-injecting homemade ge-
netic material in attempts to change the 
expression of muscle growth factors to 
improve strength or to treat diseases such 
as HIV or herpes (2). Where self-experi-
mentation is undertaken by groups that 
coordinate their efforts, these activities can 
begin to look like decentralized clinical tri-
als. Some biohackers might also attempt to 
experiment on others. Although there are 
no documented instances of this to date, 
biohackers have reported (and expressed 
concerns about) being approached by indi-
viduals asking for help treating their own 
or their family members’ health conditions. 
Genetic biohacking of this sort—experimen-
tation on oneself and others—poses public 
health risks. These include interventions 
with poor safety or efficacy, a lack of true 
informed consent, and the introduction and 
uptake of unsafe and unproven “therapies” 
into commerce. The democratization of 
genetic biohacking exacerbates these pub-
lic health risks because many experiments 
make use of easy-to-obtain materials and 
equipment purchased from companies that 
cater to the do-it-yourself (DIY) market or 
freely provided by other biohackers.
There are other emerging areas of DIY 
science, such as neurohacking and self-
manufacture of traditional pharmaceutical 
products, that do not focus on molecular ge-
netics but that similarly raise public health 
concerns. Genetic biohacking, however, is 
especially easy, affordable, and a particu-
larly popular and promising form of DIY 
science that poses unclear but potentially 
serious or far-reaching risks. These include, 
for example, sick individuals foregoing 
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known, effective treatments in the hope of 
cheaper and unproven DIY genetic inter-
ventions or, at an extreme, harmful germ-
line modifications. As has been the case for 
“alternative” cancer treatments and autolo-
gous stem cell transplants, hype and access 
to biological reagents have the potential to 
pose substantial public health concerns. Ge-
netic biohacking communities, therefore, 
should be an important focus for regulating 
DIY science.
GOVERNMENT REGULATION
As biohacking has become more prevalent 
and public, scholars, ethicists, and regula-
tors have voiced concerns that government 
oversight may be absent or inadequate to 
address the risks that these activities may 
pose. Indeed, biohackers sometimes work 
in private, whereas traditional research is 
conducted in teams overseen by institu-
tions. Biohackers generally do not obtain 
ethical review of their work, in contrast 
to traditional biological research. Further-
more, biohackers are often self-funded and 
are thus not typically accountable to private 
or agency funders, unlike their traditional, 
professional counterparts.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, 
however, genetic biohacking does not oc-
cur in a legal or ethical “wild west” (1). 
In the United States, there are a number 
of laws and regulations that appear to be 
relevant. We focus on the U.S. regulatory 
landscape because the United States is a 
popular site for genetic biohacking and the 
home of the earliest community laborato-
ries. Unlike some European countries, the 
United States does not ban genome editing 
conducted outside of licensed laboratories, 
although it is not unlikely that such a ban 
would be proposed if it is discovered (as it 
was with He) that some genetic biohackers 
have crossed generally observed lines of 
ethics or safety. Our objective is to help U.S. 
regulators better prepare for that day. Al-
though our recommendations may not pre-
cisely translate to other countries because 
each jurisdiction has a unique regulatory 
system and philosophy, they may nonethe-
less be broadly informative of potential 
regulatory responses.
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), for example, has extensive power 
to regulate the public health impacts of 
genetic biohacking, with jurisdiction that 
reaches farther than many biohackers re-
alize. In many circumstances, the things 
used by genetic biohackers—such as raw 
biological materials, traditional drug prod-
ucts, and DIY CRISPR kits—are, by stat-
ute, FDA-regulatable drugs. Other articles, 
such as human gene therapy products, also 
come within FDA’s purview over biologics 
(3). Moreover—and contrary to popular be-
lief—money need not always change hands 
for an item to fall within FDA’s jurisdiction, 
a wrinkle important for biohackers who 
freely provide or exchange materials (4). 
This view of FDA’s authority was bolstered 
in November 2017 when, in response to con-
cerns about individuals using DIY CRISPR 
kits for self-experimentation, the agency 
stated that “any use of CRISPR/Cas9 gene 
editing in humans [is] gene therapy” and 
therefore subject to regulation (5).
FDA has yet to vigorously enforce its 
power in this area. To date, it has not taken 
public enforcement action against any bio-
hackers conducting genome editing. But 
this is consistent with FDA’s flexibility to 
exercise “enforcement discretion” in decid-
ing which violations merit formal action 
given limited enforcement resources. Ge-
netic biohacking may also make it practi-
cally difficult for FDA to identify violations 
that do occur, especially when committed 
by individual experimenters or small-scale 
biohacking communities.
Even so, this does not mean that new or 
more powerful regulations are warranted. 
Where FDA has chosen not to formally 
wield its enforcement power, the agency 
still has a role in community engagement—
education, warning, and standard-setting 
for activities that pose public health risks 
and that otherwise fall within its purview. 
An important function of the agency is to 
encourage communication and disclosure 
for traditional, commercial research (6). 
Through its longstanding role in assessing 
drugs and biological products, FDA is the 
government regulatory agency equipped 
with the expertise to assess the safety and 
effectiveness of genetic biohacking. FDA 
involvement, therefore, may help to realize 
the promise of genetic biohacking through 
guiding biohacking efforts toward interven-
tions that live up to the communities’ hopes.
Although FDA has begun to show inter-
est in genetic biohacking—as evidenced by 
its November 2017 statement and the par-
ticipation of officials in a 2018 “bio-citizen” 
workshop hosted not by the agency but 
by the Woodrow Wilson Center (5, 7)—the 
agency has seemingly not yet taken the 
reins through a proactive effort to deeply 
engage with or understand biohacking 
communities. Given some biohackers’ con-
tinued confusion about FDA’s authority 
over their work, the agency might begin by 
clarifying the boundaries of its jurisdiction, 
in lay terms and in sufficient detail to cover 
diverse biohacking activities, while seeking 
feedback from biohacking communities on 
how FDA could best exercise its authority in 
this space. This would provide biohacking 
communities more certainty about where 
they stand and potentially encourage new 
and innovative biohacking activities that 
might have been deterred by uncertainty 
about FDA enforcement. At the same time, 
these activities will help the agency to avoid 
repeating the mistakes it made with the 
stem cell industry, where the rapid expan-
sion of clinics offering unproven interven-
tions to patients is attributed to years of 
uncertainty around the scope of FDA ju-
risdiction and limited agency engagement. 
The agency also could draft guidances about 
typical genetic biohacking experiments and 
identify staff as points of contact for those 
engaged in genetic biohacking who would 
like to communicate with the agency. FDA’s 
lack of current engagement is a shame, but 
not one that merits revamping of the agen-
cy’s powers.
A similar approach has thus far proved 
successful for other federal authorities in 
different contexts. The risks posed by bio-
hacking in the context of “bioterrorism,” for 
example, have been the subject of study by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) 
Biological Countermeasures Unit (8). To 
police the threat of biohacking-mediated 
bioterrorism, and in contrast to FDA’s work, 
the FBI has developed strong relationships 
with community labs, where some genetic 
experimentation is occurring.
Efforts at community engagement should 
focus on the potential public health harms 
posed by genetic biohacking, such as ad-
verse effects from the administration of 
homemade gene therapies, contamination 
of the environment from poorly kept ge-
netic reagents (such as viral vectors), and 
the forgoing of traditional treatments in 
favor of DIY experimental ones. Specific 
risks (and potential benefits) of genetic bio-
hacking involving humans will depend on 
the context of their use. Thus, assessment 
should include, for example, ascertaining 
whether a homemade genetic intervention 
is intended as a therapy for a disease with 
no known treatment, a disease for which 
there are known effective treatments, or for 
some other purpose, such as an enhance-
ment or aesthetic use.
PRIVATE REGULATION
Genetic biohacking is also potentially sub-
ject to U.S. laws that are enforced by pri-
vate rather than government actors. These 
may fill some of the gaps in public regula-
tors’ ambit (9). Patent owners, for example, 
can impose ethical restrictions on licens-
ees, such as the Broad Institute’s licenses 
for its CRISPR patents to Bayer (formerly 
Monsanto), with conditions that Bayer 
avoid research activities that are potentially 
harmful to public health, including tobacco 
research and germline editing (10). Such li-












INSIGHTS   |   POLICY FORUM
cense restrictions can—and should—be used 
to police commercial manufacturers of ge-
nome-editing kits and reagents popular in 
biohacking communities, just as they have 
previously been used to prevent activities 
that pose national security, environmen-
tal, or public health risks (11). Even with-
out a license in place, patent owners can 
enforce restrictions through threats of pat-
ent infringement litigation against any re-
calcitrant biohackers or manufacturers of 
biohacking products. A similar model was 
proposed as an attempt to restrict the use 
of “gene drive technology”—inheritable ver-
sions of CRISPR designed to drive a specific 
allele through generations of a population 
(12). Beyond patents, people injured by ge-
netic biohacking materials could potentially 
bring tort law claims against biohackers 
and component suppliers to seek compen-
sation for their injuries. A person injured 
while using a DIY CRISPR kit, for example, 
would likely be able to sue the seller of the 
kit—a potentially strong deterrent to mar-
keters of unsafe biohacking materials.
Apart from these legal mechanisms, some 
biohacking communities have adopted their 
own ethics restrictions, which, even if not 
intended to do so, might indirectly avoid 
harms to public health caused by genetic 
biohacking. The International Genetically 
Engineered Machine (iGEM) Competition, 
for example, requires its participants to 
comport with a strict program of bioethics 
(13). The International Gene Synthesis Con-
sortium—a group of commercial suppliers 
of genetic materials—developed protocols 
for screening orders and verifying custom-
ers in an effort to prevent dangerous uses. 
For example, protocols may instruct suppli-
ers to decline orders for delivery to home 
addresses or post office boxes (9). Although 
this is an important effort, some biohackers 
have nonetheless devised ways to pass such 
screening by, for instance, registering busi-
nesses for the purpose of obtaining institu-
tional addresses.
Another example of self-governance is 
community labs’ adoption of safety poli-
cies, which often include standards detailed 
in the cornerstone of biosafety practices 
in the United States, the Biosafety in Mi-
crobiological and Biomedical Laboratories 
guidance document. These policies include 
restrictions on experimentation in humans, 
one of the riskiest forms of genetic biohack-
ing with the largest potential negative con-
sequence to public health. A grant-funded 
effort spearheaded by North Carolina State 
University is currently under way to un-
derstand and improve on community labs’ 
safety policies with guidance from biosafety 
officers established in three labs. Analo-
gously, a code of ethics adopted in 2011 by 
an organization of DIY biologists, DIYbio.
org, remains an important touchstone for 
experiments (14).
Given that many biohackers who conduct 
work at home are also members of com-
munity labs (15), their safety policies have 
the potential to go a long way in promoting 
safety in genetic biohacking. Outside the 
norms of community labs and traditional 
scientific institutions, many who engage 
in biohacking activities nonetheless rely 
on each other for materials and informa-
tion, providing a positive downstream ef-
fect to community labs’ ability to police the 
conduct of biohacking communities. These 
collaborations might also encourage trans-
parency between biohackers affiliated with 
community labs and those outside the com-
munity lab niche.
Like government regulation, private gov-
ernance of this sort is important and laud-
able but not a perfect or comprehensive 
solution. Private actors may not be inclined 
to regulate conduct that poses few risks 
to them, even if safety risks to others are 
numerous, obvious, and serious. In other 
cases, the social stigma of violating com-
munity norms may simply be an ineffec-
tive deterrent. Additionally, community 
labs’ private governance efforts only weakly 
reach genetic biohacking communities fo-
cused on human experimentation or in lo-
cations where community labs are absent.
MOVING FORWARD 
The existence of public and private gover-
nance mechanisms to mitigate the public 
health risks and encourage the innovative 
potential of biohacking—even if currently 
infrequently used—means that regulators 
can better implement these mechanisms 
rather than rely on new ones to be grafted 
into law. For example, calls for bans on bio-
hacking, such as those from a consumer ad-
vocacy organization in Australia, go too far. 
The tools for public and private regulators 
to manage biohacking’s public health risks 
are largely already available. But they must 
be used better.
As with other issues pertaining to public 
health, this also means that the future of 
regulating biohacking lies not only in more 
stringent policing, but in better education 
of its participants and a realistic under-
standing that violations will be inevitable. 
Education would help private actors to un-
derstand the risks posed by certain forms of 
biohacking and to appreciate FDA’s role in 
both consumer protection and fostering of 
innovation (6). Likewise, public regulators 
such as FDA would benefit from engaging 
with stakeholders to better understand ge-
netic biohacking activities, its participants’ 
perspectives, and biohacking communi-
ties’ potential for self-governance—much 
as it already does with the pharmaceutical 
industry. Even with limited enforcement 
resources, agencies such as FDA have an 
opportunity to advance public health by 
working with biohacking communities as 
their practices and norms are being devel-
oped—and before potentially problematic 
norms of risk, secrecy, and mavericks be-
come widespread.
No government or private policy will ever 
achieve perfect compliance, even in tradi-
tional scientific settings—as He’s experi-
ments painfully demonstrate. There will 
always be “rogue actors” who may main-
tain connections with their institutional 
communities even after being “caught” 
(1). Striving for perfect compliance comes 
with substantial burdens, including throt-
tling the development of new technologies, 
expending scarce enforcement resources, 
and facing political backlash. Appreciat-
ing this should allow policy-makers and 
regulators—both public and private—to 
understand that different genetic biohack-
ing activities will pose different risks and 
should merit different approaches, and to 
tailor existing regulatory mechanisms to 
mitigate genetic biohacking’s risks while 
amplifying its potential. j
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